Monday, August 27, 2012

Contrary choice

I’m going to make a few comments on this article: Paul Himes, “When a Christian Sins: 1 Corinthians 10:13 and the Power of Contrary Choice in Relation to the Compatibilist-Libertarian Debate.” JETS 54 (June 2011): 329-344.

A couple of general observations before I delve into the details:

i) Himes is more comfortable with exegesis than philosophy.

ii) Apropos (i), his philosophical foils consist of guys like Ware, Nash, and Edwards. But Edwards hardly represents state-of-the-art determinism, while Nash and Ware are scarcely the most astute exponents of determinism.

Ware isn’t even a real Calvinist, although I appreciate his critique of open theism. And he’s better at the destructive task than the reconstructive task.


What, then, does 1 Cor 10:13 have to do with the compatibilist-libertarian debate? To begin with, one must stress the limits that 1 Cor 10:13 places on the nature of temptation. The verse indicates that the Christian is not forced to succumb to temptation and possesses the capability to resist. In other words, the temptation has its limits and does not possess the power to force the Christian to succumb to it (or, more accurately, it does not possess the power to render the Christian unable to endure). In other words, the temptation is such that not succumbing to it is possible.

i) To equate predestination with “force” is a popular canard. “Force” suggests that we are acting against our will. That we consciously wish to do one thing, but are made to do something else. However, predestination (or determinism) would generally operate at a subconscious level. We don’t consciously resist what we’re predestined to do, for all our thoughts, feelings, and actions are the seamless effect of predestination. We’re not directly aware of what’s causing them. We lack that detachment or objectivity.

ii) In addition, if predestination is true, then it’s not the temptation that “forces” us to succumb to temptation. Rather, it’s predestination which ensures our succumbence to temptation. If predestination is true, then temptation is not a sufficient condition to ensure succumbence to temptation, for God could predestine that we either resist or give in to the same temptation.

No doubt Himes would not regard that as an improvement over the version he’s attacking. However, his argument isn’t calibrated to the actual position he’s attacking. So that doesn’t derive from his exegesis, even if his exegesis were sound. At the very least he’d need to restructure his argument, assuming his original argument can be salvaged.


Thus, if this paper’s interpretation of 1 Cor 10:13 is correct, one must assert that a believer, no matter what the situation, has the ability to choose not to sin (since God does not allow the temptation to get to the point where the end result is, by necessity, sin).

i) This assumes that the verse is dealing with temptation in general, rather than a specific type of temptation. But it’s arguable that Paul has specific reference to divine protection against apostasy or sins which lead to apostasy.

ii) If we accept his interpretation, then that’s an argument for perfectionism. It’s possible that a Christian can lead a sinless life. But is that either Scriptural or empirically plausible?


Furthermore, by “possible,” we must mean “a legitimate possibility.” One could argue that resisting sin is physically or mentally possible, but that the Christian’s pre-set scale of values has already decreed that he or she will not resist the temptation to sin. Yet this would seem to miss the whole point of the passage and allow the Corinthian believers the very excuse that Paul seeks to deny them. In other words, the Corinthians could simply argue that their scale of values has been set such that they naturally value the city’s social life over their own sanctification. Since their own scale of values were set by things outside of their control (including their own character), they could legitimately say, according to a compatibilist scheme, that the temptation was too strong for them at that particular situation, the very point that 1 Corinthians 10 denies.

i) Actually, the notion that our character may preselect our choices is consistent with libertarianism. Prior choices can shape character, which–in turn–conditions subsequent choices.

ii) If a Christian were predestined to sin, would he cite predestination to excuse his sin? But that presents something of a psychological paradox. For, as I already noted, the fact of predestination doesn’t imply an awareness of predestination. That’s normally subliminal. We don’t directly experience predestination. Rather, we experience the result. We’re on the receiving end of the process. Our experience would feel the same if our choices and actions were randomly produced.

6 comments:

  1. "i) Himes is more comfortable with exegesis than philosophy."

    This is key because where conflict arises, methodological exegesis (ME) takes pride of place; thus ME places limits on philosophy and not conversely.

    "i) To equate predestination with “force” is a popular canard."

    You cannot quote Himes to that effect. In fact, "predestination" as defined by classical Arminianism is perfectly consistent with Himes' overall exegetical conclusions. [Q1]: Provide one citation from an Arminian scholar where your alleged "canard" is made "popular"?

    "We don’t consciously resist what we’re predestined to do, for all our thoughts, feelings, and actions are the seamless effect of predestination."

    Can the stench of irony be any thicker: [Q2]: On what epistemic grounds do you equate predestination with temptation? In fact, James 1:13, affirms flatly that God himself *cannot* tempt anyone!

    "We’re not directly aware of what’s causing them. We lack that detachment or objectivity."

    This is like saying "I don't speak a word of English." Apparently, your saying so, reveals an awareness, even if you're empirically aloof from it! For, were it to be true, you wouldn't be uttering such a proposition in the first place. Its self-referentially incoherent.

    "Rather, it’s predestination which ensures our succumbence to temptation. If predestination is true, then temptation is not a sufficient condition to ensure succumbence to temptation, for God could predestine that we either resist or give in to the same temptation."

    This is long on anthropocentric assertions, scant on exegesis. [Q3] Where in scripture is there an argumentative pericope that links predestination to temptation, in general? Where? Especially when the opposite is taught; James identifies the source of it as your "own" (v. 14).

    "However, his argument isn’t calibrated to the actual position he’s attacking. So that doesn’t derive from his exegesis, even if his exegesis were sound. At the very least he’d need to restructure his argument, assuming his original argument can be salvaged."

    Nonsense. Baseless assertions are no substitute for counter-exegesis, much less for sloppy rants against cherry picked quotations.

    "But it’s arguable that Paul has specific reference to divine protection against apostasy or sins which lead to apostasy."

    This too is demonstrably false. The same apostolic author undercuts such "protection." Rom. 11:17-24 shows God lopping off the very believers He himself grafted in the first place. The phrase "God is able to graft them in again" presupposes a change from one redemptive state of affairs to another—that is, faith, revert to unbelief, and back to faith "again" (v. 23).

    The Calvinist retreats and strongly steers clear of the textual data here, and appeals to theologizing in abstraction to salvage traditional dogma. Here Calvinists abjectly fail to reconcile their late-medieval Calvinism with Paulinism.

    "i) Actually, the notion that our character may preselect our choices is consistent with libertarianism. Prior choices can shape character, which–in turn–conditions subsequent choices."

    But these prior choices, on your assumptions, are not ultimately up to us, including the responses to temptation. So in 1 Cor. 10, God is providing himself with hope?

    "ii) If a Christian were predestined to sin, would he cite predestination to excuse his sin? But that presents something of a psychological paradox. For, as I already noted, the fact of predestination doesn’t imply an awareness of predestination."

    The entire character of this bare-bone-assertions post is self-refuting. The apparent dictum "Regarding that about which one cannot speak one should keep silent."

    Even more generally speaking, why would any Calvinist bother to critique other views when it's assumed that their opponents are predestined to believe as they do?

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    Replies
    1. Sarin8/28/2012 6:24 PM

      “This is key because where conflict arises, methodological exegesis (ME) takes pride of place; thus ME places limits on philosophy and not conversely.”

      Himes’s argument is both exegetical and philosophical. They are linked. So if his philosophical analysis fails, his argument fails.

      “You cannot quote Himes to that effect.”

      No only can I, I did.

      “In fact, ‘predestination’ as defined by classical Arminianism is perfectly consistent with Himes' overall exegetical conclusions.”

      That’s extraneous to the actual argument he used. So your statement is irrelevant–as usual.

      “Provide one citation from an Arminian scholar where your alleged ‘canard’ is made ‘popular’?”

      Don’t play dumb. That’s ubiquitous.

      “Can the stench of irony be any thicker: [Q2]: On what epistemic grounds do you equate predestination with temptation?”

      I didn’t. You need to learn how to reason.

      “In fact, James 1:13, affirms flatly that God himself *cannot* tempt anyone!”

      i) I’ve discussed Jas 1:13 elsewhere. Try again.

      ii) Moreover, your comment is irrelevant. I was responding to the concept of “force.” Pity you can never keep up with the actual state of the argument.

      “This is like saying ‘I don't speak a word of English.’ Apparently, your saying so, reveals an awareness, even if you're empirically aloof from it! For, were it to be true, you wouldn't be uttering such a proposition in the first place. Its self-referentially incoherent.”

      You’re not nearly as smart as you think you are. Experience is not the only source of knowledge. Brush up on your epistemology.

      We know about predestination because that’s a revealed truth. If God hadn’t revealed that fact, it’s not something we could empirically detect.

      “This is long on anthropocentric assertions, scant on exegesis.”

      This is a case where logic will suffice. You haven’t disproven my statement. Try again.

      “Nonsense. Baseless assertions are no substitute for counter-exegesis, much less for sloppy rants against cherry picked quotations.”

      Far from baseless, I argued for my conclusion. I don’t need to provide counterexegesis to demonstrate that Himes missed the target. I’m just responding to him on his own terms. Try to keep track of the argument.

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    2. Cont. “This too is demonstrably false.”

      I’ve documented that in detail elsewhere. Just because you’re a newbie here doesn’t mean I need to reinvent the wheel for your sake.

      “Rom. 11:17-24 shows God lopping off the very believers He himself grafted in the first place. The phrase ‘God is able to graft them in again’ presupposes a change from one redemptive state of affairs to another—that is, faith, revert to unbelief, and back to faith ‘again’ (v. 23).”

      Aside from the irrelevancy of your comparison, Paul’s reference is diachronic, not synchronic. He’s not referring to the same group of Jews. Rather, God hardens one generation, and softens another.

      “The Calvinist retreats and strongly steers clear of the textual data here, and appeals to theologizing in abstraction to salvage traditional dogma.”

      You’re substituting a different argument than Himes used. I realize that Arminian theology fosters egocentrism, but my post wasn’t about you. I was critiquing an article by Himes.

      “But these prior choices, on your assumptions, are not ultimately up to us, including the responses to temptation. So in 1 Cor. 10, God is providing himself with hope?”

      Irrelevant–as usual. I’m not stating my own position. Rather, I’m stating the libertarian position.

      “Even more generally speaking, why would any Calvinist bother to critique other views when it's assumed that their opponents are predestined to believe as they do?”

      Well that’s a silly objection. What they are predestined to believe today may not be what they are predestined to believe tomorrow.

      Delete
  2. "Edwards hardly represents state-of-the-art determinism"

    Who represents?

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  3. Thanks for the defense, Sarin!
    For what it's worth, there is a formal, peer-reviewed response to my position forthcoming in a future issue of JETS, followed by my formal rejoinder. Hopefully both will provide more food-for-thought.
    Best wishes to you all,
    Paul Himes

    ReplyDelete